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Abstract
The controversy over the granting of patenting rights to three new strains of Basmati rice by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is used as a case study to analyze the impact of incomplete
protection of intellectual property. Results suggest that the introduction of a competing product
that may infringe on India’s geographical indicator has lowered the product differentiation of
Indian Basmati rice in key export markets.
KEYWORDS: geographical indications, international market, TRIPS, Basmati, intellectual
property rights, product differentiation
 1  Introduction 
 
The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which seeks 
to harmonize global intellectual property laws, has been a major factor in 
strengthening worldwide property rights. However, since its formulation, the 
TRIPS agreement has been the subject of considerable controversy and a source 
of concern among some policy makers and producers in developing nations who 
feel it favors developed countries. Particularly, the protection of traditional 
knowledge has been a cause of debate over the granting of property rights to firms 
for minor alterations of traditional practices or varieties. Geographical indications 
(GIs) are one aspect of intellectual property that may afford protection to 
traditional knowledge without conferring absolute power to any one individual. 
Yet, many developing countries have failed to take advantage of this form of 
protection, arguing that the current TRIPS act does not go far enough to protect 
traditional products. This has led to allegations of “biopiracy” by developing 
countries toward firms who use genetic material from traditional varieties.  
Though there has been a lot of speculation on the impact of TRIPS and the 
strengthening of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) system in developing 
countries, there remains a dearth of empirical studies on the actual impact of 
ineffectual IPRs. The controversy over the granting of patenting rights to three 
strains of Basmati rice to RiceTec, Inc. by the US Patent and Trademark Office 
provides a good case study. Basmati, a long-grained rice that has been grown in 
the Himalayan foothills of northwest India and Pakistan for centuries, is a major 
source of export revenue. India and Pakistan argue that the US Patent office’s 
granting of a patent to RiceTec on a variant of Basmati severely harmed their 
export markets. In this study, export trade in Basmati rice is used as an example to 
determine the impact of inadequate protection of intellectual property. Thus the 
main objective of this paper is to determine how much, if at all, the introduction 
of RiceTec’s Basmati variety harmed India’s export markets. Although the data 
have limitations, our empirical evidence suggests that there is enough evidence to 
at least prompt nations to move more quickly to institute policies such as 
geographical indications and that there may be a need to make these indications 
more specific in future trade talks in order to protect traditional varieties.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the TRIPS 
regulations pertaining to geographical indications and details the controversy 
surrounding the granting of a patent to RiceTec, Inc. Section three provides a 
brief description of the Basmati rice industry in India. Section four outlines the 
theoretical and empirical model specification and the data used in this study. 
Section five presents the results, with conclusions and implications discussed in 
section six. 
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2  Background on Geographical Indications and the Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) 
 
The TRIPS agreement, which seeks global harmonization of intellectual property 
(IP) laws, came into effect in 1995. All countries that are members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) are required to follow the TRIPS guidelines to adopt 
common global laws for protection of intellectual property or face the risk of 
trade sanctions (WTO 2011). Developing countries often argue that the TRIPS 
agreement hampers protection of traditional knowledge, something that is an 
integral part of the agricultural economies of many countries. The focus of 
developing countries has largely been patents, the more popular form of 
protection, which are arguably unsuitable for protection of traditional knowledge, 
as patents grant legal rights to one person or firm. Other forms of protection of 
intellectual property such as trademarks and in particular geographical indications 
(GIs) offer alternatives but have limitations of their own. In this section, we first 
look at some of the features of GI that facilitate protection of traditional 
knowledge.1 Afterward, we discuss how protections via GI could have 
ameliorated the controversy surrounding the Basmati rice patent granted to 
RiceTec Inc.  
Under TRIPS, GIs are defined as “indications which identify a good as 
originating in the territory of a member, or a region or locality in that territory, 
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin” (Article 22(1)).  
Article 23 of the TRIPS agreement provides additional protection, but 
only to wines and spirits. Article 23.1 states that wine and spirit producers may 
not mislead consumers as to the geographical origin or the production style of the 
product. Also, this section prohibits use of the terms “kind,” “type,” “style,” and 
“imitation” (i.e. “this product is a type of Scotch Whiskey”) in order to prevent 
other producers producing similar products from exploiting the reputation built by 
producers whose products are protected under this act. The additional protection 
offered to wines, spirits and other commodities has been contentious because the 
protected products are so few and seem to indicate a European bias. Negotiations 
are currently underway to extend Article 23 in order to provide additional 
protection to other commodities (WTO TRIPS 2011).  
Article 24 states some exceptions under which GIs do not hold. If a name 
associated with a particular geographic origin has become “generic,” that is, it is 
associated with a number of products, then the particular name can be used 
                                                 
1 GIs have limitations of their own, the first being GIs intended to protect indigenous knowledge 
protect only tangible traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions. The knowledge 
associated with GIs remains unprotected and open to the public due to which there is possibility of 
misuse by third parties. 
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outside of the geographic origin, even if the name was originally used to denote a 
product of that region. Two examples are cheddar cheese and Dijon mustard. 
Article 24 of TRIPS also states that “there will be no obligation under this 
agreement to protect geographical indications which are not or cease to be 
protected in their country of origin” (WTO TRIPS 2011). Thus, nations using GI 
must protect their products through their own legislation; otherwise the name will 
be, essentially, up for grabs. This fact is of importance to the present study 
because India’s legislature moved very slowly to extend GI protection to its 
agricultural products such as Basmati. One argument that we make here is that 
“foot dragging” can be costly. 
 
2.1  Basmati Rice Patent (US patent No. 5663484) 
 
Basmati, which means the “perfumed one,” is a high-quality, long-grain, semi-
dwarf rice that has been grown in the foothills of the Himalayas for thousands of 
years. Basmati rice requires deep, fertile soil, a cool climate and a short 
photoperiod. As such it is difficult to grow Basmati rice for commercial purposes 
in other areas. Nonetheless, a Texas rice development company, RiceTec, Inc. 
(RiceTec) began producing and exporting a Basmati-type rice it called “Texmati” 
in 1985, long before TRIPS. After TRIPS came about, RiceTec sought to obtain a 
US patent on its rice. On September 2, 1997, RiceTec did obtain a patent titled 
“Basmati rice lines and grains” on the basis of 20 claims made by the company in 
its patent application to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
The patent was for novel rice lines, methods used to make the different varieties 
and determine the rice quality. Claims 1-14 of the patent pertained to the general 
characteristics of rice grown in North America, South America, Central America 
and the Caribbean. Claims 15 to 17 were for rice grains without any limit to GI. 
Claims 18 to 20 pertained to the specific methods used by RiceTec to develop the 
rice lines. All 20 claims made related to cross-bred rice lines and grain developed 
by RiceTec. Of the 20 specific claims made by RiceTec, claims 15 to 17 seemed 
especially harmful to the Indian export market since they pertained to particular 
characteristics of Basmati grain. In these claims RiceTec included a claim to 90% 
of the rice’s germplasm as well as traditional varieties like Bas 370, Taraori, and 
Basmati Karnal cultivated in India (Nilacharal 2001; USPTO US Patent No. 
5,663,484 1997).2  
 
                                                 
2 Specifically, Claim 15 sought patent status on the following characteristics: a rice grain that has a 
starch index which ranges from 27 to 35;  a 2-acetyl-1-pyrroline content around 150 ppb to 2000 
ppb.; length around 6.2mm to 8.0mm, width ranging from 1.6 mm to 1.9mm and a length/width 
ratio of around 3.5 to 4.5; a whole grain index ranging from 41 to 63; a 75% to 150% increase in 
the length of the grain when cooked, and a chalk index less than 20. 
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In short, RiceTec’s claims of patentable property on its rice lines were in 
fact typical characteristics of Basmati rice. For example, the 2-acetyl-1-pyrroline 
content compound is what gives Basmati rice its distinctive aromatic scent. Based 
on the patent granted to RiceTec by the USPTO, RiceTec next applied for the 
registration of the trademark “Texmati” (which is marketed as “American 
Basmati”) with the UK Trademark Registry in 1997 (Nilacharal 2001; USPTO 
US Patent No. 5,663,484 1997). The UK is a very important export destination for 
Basmati rice, and since the US and UK are members of WTO, upon granting of a 
trademark in the UK, RiceTec would be able to market its product as a Basmati 
rice there in direct competition with traditional Basmati from India and Pakistan.  
In April 2000, officials of the Indian Agricultural and Processed Food 
Products Export Development Authority (APEDA), a body established for 
development of agricultural commodities and furthering their exports, filed a 
petition with the USPTO to reexamine the Basmati patent, specifically claims 15 
through 17. It took APEDA over two years to gather the data to challenge the 
claim due to the intricacies of RiceTec’s claims (Nilacharal 2001; USPTO US 
Patent No. 5,663,484 1997). Another complication is that under US patent law, a 
patent can be challenged only after it is granted. Further, challenging an entire 
patent is complex because if a plaintiff loses on even one count of the claims in 
the patent the entire patent can be upheld (Ramchandran 2000). Soon after 
APEDA’s challenge, RiceTec gave up the right to claim 4 and claims 15 through 
17. Even with this concession, however, the USPTO found that the 16 remainder 
claims were also questionable.  
Subsequently, RiceTec was issued notice by USPTO on March 27, 2001 
that its patent was in jeopardy. RiceTec then withdrew the remainder claims 
except claims 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 which pertained to new cross-bred lines 
developed by RiceTec that are not similar to any of the varieties grown in India, 
although Rice Tec claims that the new rice varieties produce grains “similar or 
superior to those of good quality Basmati rice” (Nilacharal 2001; USPTO US 
Patent No. 5,663,484 1997).  
At present, RiceTec has a narrow patent on three specific rice varieties 
developed through the company’s own research. However, because it no longer 
has a patent on Basmati lines, it is prohibited from using the term “Basmati” in 
marketing its rice. Nevertheless, the revised patent does not prohibit RiceTec 
from marketing its rice as similar to Basmati (Damodaran 2001; US Patent No. 
5,663,484). Thus, there are two aspects to this controversy: one that deals with the 
actual patent and the other associated with the product. 
Though RiceTec and to some extent the Indian government viewed the 
outcome to be just, Indian advocates of the “traditional knowledge” indicator felt 
that the name “Basmati” was still under jeopardy as “Basmati” was considered a 
generic term under US law. At the same time that the Indian government 
4 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 9 [2011], Article 4
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requested the USPTO reexamine RiceTec’s patent, the Research Foundation for 
Science, Technology and Ecology (RFSTE), a US-based non-governmental 
organization, filed a petition with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to control 
the use of the word “Basmati” in domestic marketing, arguing that Basmati was 
not a generic term and the use of such would deceive consumers into believing 
that the rice they were buying was from South Asia.3 
RFSTE’s petition was rejected by the FTC on two grounds.4 Firstly, the 
FTC felt the damage to consumers was overstated. Secondly, the FTC said that 
there were no agricultural regulations to govern the use of the term “Basmati” for 
rice originating from a particular region. According to the FTC, Basmati rice is 
“included as an example of ‘aromatic rough rice,’ and is not limited to rice grown 
in any particular country” (Subbiah 2003). 
RiceTec markets “Texmati,” “Kasmati” and “Jasmati” (“Texmati” and 
“Kasmati” are marketed as substitutes for Basmati while “Jasmati” is marketed as 
the American version of Jasmine rice grown in Thailand, which incidentally has a 
large export market in the US and other countries). Though India was successful 
in winning the legal battle against RiceTec in the US, it still faced legal battles in 
about 25 countries for 40 different cases since TRIPS places the onus on the 
importing nation, not the exporting nation, of deciding whether another nation’s 
GI of its traditional goods is valid. According to APEDA, these cases are varied 
and the battle ranges from obtaining exclusive control over the Basmati trademark 
in each country to breaches of the geographical indication of Basmati. In order to 
cover the legal costs to fight the cases, the All India Rice Exporters’ Association 
has established a Basmati Development Fund which has been collecting Rs. 
50/ton (approx $1.09/ton) for Basmati rice exported from India. India has also 
obtained the aid of the Trademark Watch Agency to report any new trademark 
applications for Basmati rice or its variations that are filed overseas (Nilacharal 
2001).  
Of the 40 cases filed, India has been successful in winning 15 cases 
around the world including in the UK, Brazil, Greece, Australia, France, Spain, 
Chile and UAE. In Spain, APEDA has been successful in obtaining a registered 
trademark for Basmati rice as aromatic rice produced in the sub-continent, thus 
deterring non-Indian food companies from using Basmati as a brand name. In 
Brazil, India has been able to overturn an application for using Basmati as a 
trademark for sweets and condiments. India has also been successful in two other 
                                                 
3 For details see U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484, Reexamination Certificate C1 (4525th) (reissued Jan. 
29, 2002); Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Commission Denial of Petition for 
Rulemaking Proceeding (May 15, 2001),  http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/05/fyi0131.htm. 
4 For details see “Letter Declining to Take Action on Request for Rulemaking to Prevent Such 
Advertising” (May 9, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/riceletter.pdf. 
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cases against RiceTec in Greece and the UK (Nilacharal 2001). A French food 
company, “Establissments Haudecoeur La Courneuve,” was given two trademarks 
by the French government to use the name “Basmati,” specifically, “Riz Long 
Basmati” and “Riz Long Basmati Riz du Monde” (The Economic Times 1998). 
The Indian government has opposed the trademarks and is still awaiting a 
decision from the French Trademark Office. In Greece, RiceTec filed an 
application to register “Texmati,” “Jasmati” and “Kasmati” as trademarks while 
in the UK an application was filed to register “Texmati” as a trademark.5 India 
was able to overturn both applications on the grounds that the names were very 
similar to Basmati rice and therefore very misleading (Nilacharal 2001).  
We argue that India could have avoided the legal battle and strengthened 
Basmati’s position in the global market if it had registered Basmati as a GI earlier; 
however, this would have required updating its intellectual property laws, a 
process which has been slow in a country without a long history of trademark and 
patent law. It eventually did so, but by then it came at a cost. Further, a revamped 
TRIPS agreement that extended Article 23 to cover traditional goods, not just 
wines and spirits, would also have prevented RiceTec from marketing its Kasmati 
brand rice as “traditional Basmati style” or the Texmati brand as “American 
Basmati.”  
In part because of stories like this, India, Switzerland, the EU, the Czech 
Republic, and Morocco have advocated stronger and wider protection for 
agricultural products under GIs. However, the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand, who were initially in favor of intellectual property rights and GIs for 
wines and spirits, are opposed to the widening of Article 23 of the GIs to cover 
other agricultural products (RAFI 2000). They argue that whether or not to allow 
imports of products labeled in a manner potentially misleading to the general 
public should be a discretion exercised by the individual importing country. 
Indian Basmati is offered protection in some countries. For example, the UK 
Grain and Feed Trade Association, which is the largest importer of Basmati rice 
in Europe, specifically states that only long-grain rice from India and Pakistan can 
be labeled as Basmati rice. Saudi Arabia, which is the largest importer of Indian 
Basmati, allows only Basmati rice grown in the Indian sub-continent to be labeled 
as Basmati rice (BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest 1998).  
A point to note here is that RiceTec applied for a patent after TRIPS came 
into force. Prior to TRIPS, member countries were not required to adopt common 
global levels of protection for intellectual property. Therefore, there was little 
India could do to obtain a GI for Basmati rice in the United Sates prior to TRIPS. 
                                                 
5 RiceTec acquired the trademarks “Texmati” and “Kasmati” in the UK. India challenged the 
trademark by gathering affidavits from culinary experts and the London Rice Brokers, after which 
RiceTec decided to surrender its registration of both trademarks. See Nair and Kumar (2005) 
Geographical Indications: A Search for Identity. LexisNexis Butterworths, New Delhi. 
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As stated in Article 24, in order for GIs to be protected in other member 
countries, they must be protected under national law in their country of origin, 
something which India has been very slow to accomplish. The Indian government 
passed the Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act in 
1999 (Ramchandran 2000) but to date has yet to fully protect Basmati as a GI.6 As 
such, Basmati rice from India would seem to be a good case study for analyzing 
harm from “foot dragging.” Specifically, we wish to determine if there was any 
harm from the patent granted to RiceTec in the form of losses to India’s key 
export markets as a result of not providing, or being unable to provide, adequate 
protection to Basmati rice. 
 
3  The Basmati Rice Industry in India 
 
In the Basmati rice market, India is the largest producer and exporter (ITCIBD 
2003). Of the total production of Basmati rice almost two-thirds is exported 
(Bhattacharjee, Singhal and Kulkarni 2002). The total world demand for Basmati 
rice is around 1.18 million tons and is valued at $700 million (Padmanabhan 
2003). The majority of the exports are to the Middle-East and the UK with a 
relatively small percentage to North America. Saudi Arabia is the largest importer 
of Basmati rice (65% of Indian exports), followed by the United Kingdom (15% 
of Indian exports), Kuwait (10%), UAE (5%) and other countries (5%) (ITCIBD 
2003). The Indian Basmati export market is characterized by approximately 134 
registered Basmati exporters with a few of these having very large positions in 
particular export destinations. Of these the major exporter is KRBL followed by 
Amira foods, DD International, SunStar Overseas, Sutnam Overseas and United 
Exports (Damodaran 2001; Asia Pacific Biotech 1999; Business Line 2002; 
Srinivas 2002).  
The goal for the rest of the paper is to establish how much, if at all, the 
introduction of RiceTec’s products harmed India’s ability to extract any price 
premia for Basmati rice and, by association, how India hurt itself by not 
advancing its own GI earlier. 
 
                                                 
6 Though the Indian Cabinet has given APEDA statutory powers to initiate the process for 
registration of Basmati rice as a GI, it has yet to be registered. For details see “APEDA gets 
powers to protect Basmati patent rights,” available at http://www.newkerala.com/topstory-
fullnew-24036.html. One of the reasons for this is due to the differences in selecting the right 
Basmati variety that has the traits of traditional “Basmati.” Over the years scientists have 
developed many different strains of Basmati rice, the traits of which have deviated from the 
traditional Basmati. Another reason for the delay is in identifying the exact geographical area 
where Basmati is grown since it is now grown in other parts of the country away from its origin in 
the Dehradun district.  For details see Das (2007). 
7Mulik and Crespi: Geographical Indications and TRIPS
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
4  Theoretical Framework 
 
The Lerner index (relative markup of price over marginal cost), defined as L = (P-
MC)/P where P is the output price and MC is the marginal cost per unit of output, 
is conventionally used to measure the degree of price premia by a firm in a 
particular market, with larger Lerner margins implying greater differentiation 
among competing products. However, in practice it is difficult to calculate the 
Lerner index since it requires data on price, and the marginal cost of every firm 
selling a product in a particular industry. This problem becomes more complex in 
an international market setting where an exporting country has many firms that 
export products to many destinations and face different competitors in each 
destination (see Karp and Perloff 1989; Carter and MacLaren 1997; Goldberg and 
Knetter 1999). Furthermore, in countries like India, gathering sufficient data, 
especially of a historical nature, is troublesome. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
relationship between the Lerner index and the residual (inverse) demand curve is 
well known and makes analyses of product differentiation somewhat easier. For 
this exercise, we use the concept of the residual demand curve proposed by 
Goldberg and Knetter (1999) to determine the impact of the patent granted to 
RiceTec on India’s exports.  
A residual demand curve shows the relationship between a particular 
firm’s quantity and price while considering supply functions of all other firms in 
the same market. A flat residual demand curve indicates that a firm has little 
control over prices in the market (no product differentiation) while a steeper 
residual demand curve is indicative of the firm’s ability to obtain a price 
premium. Using the relationship between the Lerner index and the residual 
demand elasticity, dε , such that 
d
P MC 1L P ε  , we can determine the 
extent of differentiability enjoyed by Basmati exporters. Our simple test of harm 
to India from an ineffectual protection of intellectual property will be the extent of 
any change in its export Lerner index in key markets after RiceTec entered the 
market. To test for the robustness of our estimates, we will compare this index in 
markets where Basmati has a large share of the rice market (indicating a strong 
consumer preference for Basmati) with the estimation for markets in which 
Basmati has a small share of total rice demand. 
A complete analysis of the impact of RiceTec’s products on Basmati 
demand would need a great deal of data to ascertain the two goods’ 
substitutability. Unfortunately, specific variety-level data by export nation are 
scarce. Here, we propose a model that will nonetheless allow inference to be 
drawn based upon aspects of the market that are observable. We concede at the 
outset that such estimations are likely only suggestive rather than exhaustive, yet 
we have undertaken great care and consideration in obtaining the data that we use 
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here. Indeed, the data gathering necessitated travel to India to examine 
government agricultural statistics in several locations. We see our analysis in this 
paper as putting forward two arguments. First, the descriptive evidence that a 
potential for harm exists was laid out in sections II and III. Second, in the sections 
that remain, we use what data we have to ascertain any statistical evidence that 
would corroborate the circumstantial evidence previously described. Future 
analysis should necessarily try to improve upon our study, but as the first paper to 
try and document a potential harm from insufficient GI protection, we feel this is 
an important contribution even with the data limitations. 
The analysis we have adopted as proposed by Goldberg and Knetter 
(1999) is straightforward: the residual demand elasticity obtained will be used to 
determine whether the Indian Basmati exports enjoy any price premia in the 
importing countries. Along with its facility in cases where data are limited, the 
Goldberg and Knetter model has the advantage of avoiding “implausible 
aggregation assumptions (such as symmetry of firms)” and demand curves can be 
of a general nature “so that the competing products may or may not be perfect 
substitutes” (p. 37). Such conditions are appropriate to the case we have described 
for Basmati rice and RiceTec’s brand. Using this model, we ascertain whether 
premia for Indian Basmati exist and, if they do exist, whether they were 
diminished after the entry of RiceTec’s products into competing markets. A 
lessening of the residual demand elasticity after RiceTec entered the market may 
be corroborating evidence that India has not done enough to protect the distinct 
image of Basmati rice through GI protections. Further, as discussed in Goldberg 
and Knetter (1999), the benefit of the econometric approach we undertake is that 
it is not necessary to estimate cross-price elasticities of demand, marginal costs or 
conduct parameters and is thus useful in a setting where data are limited to mostly 
aggregate figures as we have. 
For illustrative purposes, consider the following model where India (I) and 
other (R) producers who market a competing rice to Basmati are considered. For 
simplicity assume these other producers are in a single country like the US (or a 
single firm like RiceTec as the Goldberg and Knetter model can be used in cases 
with one or several competing products). Let PI be the price of exports from India, 
and QI be the total exports from India such that QI =

N
1i
I
iq , where 
I
iq  is the 
quantity exported by firm i. Define Z as a vector of demand shifters. Similarly PR 
is the price of the other rice in the case of a single competing country/firm, or a 
price vector in the case of multiple countries/firms, and QR is the total quantity of 
these competing firms. Thus, the residual demands for Indian and other rice are 
given by 
 PI = DI (QI, PR, Z)  (1) 
 PR = DR (QR, PI, Z)  (2) 
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Both Indian and other producers ship to another destination country so that 
PI and PR are measured in the currencies of the importing nation. Firm i in India 
chooses quantity to maximize its profits in the destination country according to 
the following profit function: Iiπ  = PI Iiq  – eI IiC . Here eI is India’s exchange rate 
and IiC  is the cost of production and marketing of 
I
iq  in Indian currency. Similarly 
firm i in the competing nation will maximize its profit function: Riπ  = PR Riq  – 
eR RiC  where, e
R is the exchange rate and RiC  is the cost in R’s currency. 
Assuming 
k
i
l
j
q 0q
   (conjectural variation) i   j; k, l = I, R, then   i = 1,…., N 
the ith first-order conditions for the Indian and other firm are as found in Goldberg 
and Knetter (1999, pp. 36-37). Using the notation of our model gives the first-
order condition for the Indian firm: 
PI = 
IN NI I RI I I j
I I R Ii i
ii j i j
qD D De MC q 1 1Q q P P 
                     
 = 
II I I I
Ii i i
De .MC q θQ   .  
Incorporating market shares and summing across firms, Goldberg and Knetter 
(1999) derive the share-weighted industry-average, first-order equation as given 
in (3): 
 IIIII ΨQMCeP   (3) 
where I Iψ θ   is the industry-average conduct parameter where zero implies that 
the firms are perfectly competitive while one indicates that the firms act 
collusively. Following a similar procedure for the competing firm(s) obtains 
 
RRRRR ΨQMCeP  , (4) 
Simultaneously solving equations (2) and (4) reveals the other nation’s reaction 
function with respect to Indian Basmati as 
 QR*= QR (eR, MCR, R , Z, QI) (5) 
From (5) we solve for the residual demand for India, denoted PI,RES, as follows: 
 PI=PI (QI,QR*, Z) = PI,RES(QI, eR, MCR, Z, R ) (6) 
Thus, the reduced-form equation, PI,RES is no longer a function of QR. Also 
eI and MCI, being excluded from the equation, become natural cost shifters and 
can be used as instruments to determine the inverse demand. 
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4.1  Empirical Model 
 
Using the methodology described above, our estimating equation for the residual 
demand curve takes the following general linear form: 
 m
I
m00
n
mmmm
I
mmm
I
m Q.DDWZQP   , (7) 
where the subscript m denotes a specific destination market. ImP  is the per-unit 
export price of Indian Basmati, ImQ  is the quantity of Indian Basmati exports to 
market m, Zm is a vector of demand shifters for destination m, nmW is a vector of 
cost shifters for the n competitors India faces in a particular destination market 
(but does not include any cost shifters for India) and ε m is the error term. The 
dummy variable D0 measures the shift in demand after RiceTec’s entry in 1985, 
where 1 represents RiceTec’s presence and 0 otherwise. Finally, D0 ImQ  is an 
interaction term measuring the change in slope of the demand curve for Indian 
Basmati after RiceTec’s entry.7 Separate inverse residual demand equations will 
be specified for the different destinations to which India exports Basmati rice. The 
vector of cost shifters is comprised of two elements. One element consists of the 
cost shifters such as wages expressed in the competitor’s currency and the second 
element consists of the exchange rate between the competitor’s currency and the 
specific destination market. As Goldberg and Knetter note, exchange rates are 
especially useful in identifying the residual demand curve since they shift the 
relative costs of different exporting countries. Since, the quantity exported is an 
endogenous variable, it needs to be instrumented. The appropriate instruments 
that can be used are cost shifters for India that are not included in the estimating 
equation but are correlated with quantity due to the first-order condition. 
Therefore the exchange rate between India and the specific destination country 
serves as an ideal instrumental variable.  
 
4.2  Data Sources 
 
Because of data limitations and the need to find nations that also had a long 
history of imports of both Indian and RiceTec rice, we chose to examine Indian 
exports to four countries: the US, Canada, the UK and Kuwait. These can be seen 
as minor export markets (the US and Canada) and major export markets (the UK 
and Kuwait). Our prior was that we would find Lerner indices near zero for the 
US and Canadian export markets, but we would find price premia for the UK and 
                                                 
7 We also experimented with an additional dummy and interaction variable to measure changes in 
the slope of the demand curve after the granting of a patent to RiceTec in 1997, but, as the related 
coefficients were not statistically significant, nor did they alter the results in any significant way, 
we dropped these variables from our model specification to conserve degrees of freedom. 
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Kuwaiti export markets where consumers show a strong preference for Basmati. 
Data on the quantity and value of Basmati rice exports from India were obtained 
from the Foreign Trade Statistics of India (DGCI&S 1970-2006). These 
publications publish the annual quantity of Basmati rice exports (in MT) and the 
value (in Rupees) by destination. The sample period for the study was set from 
1970/71 to 2005/06.8 Prior to 1979, the Foreign Trade Statistics of India did not 
have a separate classification for Basmati rice from which to distinguish it from 
other rice. Therefore, after discussions with experts in India, rice under the 
classification “rice other than parboiled” is assumed to be Basmati rice.  
Data on the annual exchange rates, wholesale price indices, wage rates and 
producer price indices for India and the destination importing countries and the 
competitors and the destination countries were obtained from annual volumes of 
the International Financial Statistics (IMF 1970-2006) over the period 1970-
2006. 
 
5  Results and Discussion 
 
Using the empirical methodology specified above, a residual demand curve was 
estimated for Indian exports. A joint estimation for the four destination markets, 
United States, Canada, Kuwait and United Kingdom, was performed using the 
Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) approach to account for the endogenous 
quantity and the probable contemporaneous correlation among the error terms of 
the four equations. 
The dependent variable in all four equations was the per unit export price 
to the destination market expressed in the destination market currency. The 
independent variables used were the cost shifters, specifically, the wholesale price 
indices (wage indices were not available) in Pakistan (WPK) and Kuwait (WKU), 
producer price index in Thailand (WTH), and wage indices in the US (WUS) and 
UK (WUK). In addition, the exchange rates between the competitors and the 
destination market (competitor currency per destination market currency) were 
also used. PAKUS, PAKUK, PAKCA and PAKKU represent the exchange rate 
between Pakistan and the destination markets US, UK, Canada and Kuwait. 
Similarly, USUK, USCA, USKU are the exchange rates between the United 
States and the destination markets UK, Canada and Kuwait, respectively. Finally, 
THUS, THUK, THCA and THKU are the exchange rates between Thailand 
(which produces a competing aromatic, non-Basmati rice) and the obvious 
destination markets.  
                                                 
8 Because of unavailability of the complete set of volumes from 1970-2006, data for three years, 
1977, 1980, and 1986, had to be extrapolated by taking the average of the preceding and the 
following year. 
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The endogenous variables are QUS, QUK, QCA and QKU, which are the 
quantities (in tons) exported by India to the destination markets. D0 is the dummy 
variable, which measures the shift in demand after RiceTec’s entry in the market, 
where 1 represents entry of RiceTec’s Texmati (from 1985) and 0 otherwise. 
D0US, D0UK, D0CA and D0KU are interaction variables between D0 and the 
quantity exported for US, UK, Canada and Kuwait, respectively, measuring the 
change in the slope of the residual demand curve after Texmati’s entry in the 
market. The instrumental variables used for the endogenous quantity are the 
wholesale price index for India and exchange rates between India and the four 
destination markets.  
Results for the four destination markets are reported in Table 1. The R2 for 
all four equations ranged from 66% to 85%. The quantity coefficients were 
negative for all four equations but, in line with our expectations mentioned earlier, 
significant for only UK and Kuwait. This means that the best guess for the 
residual demand is that it is flat for the US and Canada, corresponding to a price 
premia of zero in these markets. However, in the important export markets of the 
UK and Kuwait, the negative and statistically significant slope indicates that a 
price premium exists for Basmati rice producers.  
In the UK equation, the quantity coefficient was negative and significant 
at the 1% level of significance. The coefficient on the exchange rate between the 
US and UK also had the expected positive sign, indicating that an increase in the 
exchange rate between US and UK increases the US’s cost of selling to the UK 
and thus allows India to charge a higher export price to the UK. The coefficient 
on the dummy variable, D0, was also significant at the 1% level as was the 
coefficient on D0UK.9 In the Kuwait equation, the coefficient on quantity 
exported was negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the 
dummy variable (D0) and interaction term (D0KU) was also significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that there was a shift in demand after the entry of RiceTec. 
Finally, as noted, the lack of sizable demand effects for Basmati in the US and 
Canadian markets is reflective of the fact that India’s Basmati rice exports to 
these countries have been relatively minor in terms of world trade, increasing only 
in the last few years. 
 
                                                 
9 We also used Chow’s breakpoint test for structural change to test for any differences in export 
demand for Basmati rice prior to and after the entry of RiceTec.  We partitioned the data into two 
sub-samples.  The first sub-sample covered the period prior to the entry of RiceTec, that is, from 
1970-1984.  The second sub-sample was from 1985-2005 when RiceTec entered the market. 
Results of the Chow test indicate that there is evidence of a structural change for India’s exports to 
the US, UK and Canada (significant at the 1% level) at the time of RiceTec’s entry.   
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Table 1: 3SLS Estimates for Indian Basmati Rice Exports to the US, Canada and Kuwait  
Dependent Variables: Export Price of Indian Basmati Rice Exports in Destination Currency 
 
Variable  United States United Kingdom        Canada         Kuwait 
Constant  59.32***  1.716                  1.36    10.56 
                       (21.48)  (3.45)                             (10.60)   (10.06) 
QUS  -0.0004                
                        (0.0011)   
QUK                  -0.0004*** 
    (0.00006) 
QCA             -0.0033    
            (0.0030)  
QKU                        -0.0003*** 
          (0.0001)          
PAKUS  -46.73 
                                (54.50) 
PAKUK       35.04 
                                                 (45.07) 
PAKCA               32.06 
                                                                                         (42.12) 
PAKKU         -4.84 
                                                                                                                                                (69.44) 
THUS  -172.58 
                 (414.66) 
THUK    -115.31 
    (213.04)  
THCA               -77.76  
              (255.19)   
THKU         -235.81 
         (504.79)  
USUK     18.18** 
    (7.79)  
USCA                              31.25*** 
               (10.02)  
USKU          -0.535 
                                                                                                                                                 (31.52) 
WUS  -0.68   -0.18              -0.056                  -0.194  
  (0.55)  (0.195)          (0.449)  (0.149) 
WPK  -0.54**  -0.181**         -0.596***                   -0.242* 
  (0.26)  (0.103)         (0.199)                   (0.101) 
WTH  0.81***  \0.392          0.642***                   -0.348 
  (0.73)  (0.263)         (0.558)                   (0.232) 
WUK    -0.195**         
    (0.092) 
WCA             -0.252***         
              (0.092)            
 
 Continued. 
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Table 1: 3SLS Estimates for Indian Basmati Rice exports to the US, Canada and Kuwait  
Dependent Variables: Export Price of Indian Basmati Rice Exports in Destination Currency – 
Continued 
 
Variable  United States United Kingdom        Canada         Kuwait 
 
WKU                          0.095 
                                   (0.699)  
D0  -4.32  -6.47***         -7.71    -8.27***  
   (6.54)  (2.13)          (6.47)                  (2.56)  
D0US  0.0004 
  (0.0011)                         
D0UK    0.0004*** 
    (0.00006) 
D0CA              0.0035 
              (0.0030)  
D0KU          0.0003*** 
         (0.0001)  
Hausman  Test 17.80  
R2  0.775   0.839           0.847  0.661 
DW-stat  1.393           1.482           1.479  1.898 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Instruments used 
include all independent variables, the exchange rate between India and each destination and the 
wholesale price index in India. 
 
We calculated the Lerner indices in two ways. First, we used the variable 
averages for the periods before and after the emergence of RiceTec (“Lerner I”), 
and second we estimated the Lerner index at each observation and then averaged 
these estimates in each period (what we denote as a “Lerner II”). While each 
method will give different magnitudes, the story is very similar. The Lerner 
indices are reported in Table 2. By comparison, the Lerner indices for the US and 
Canadian market were small to begin with and changed little with or without the 
presence of RiceTec. Given that the underlying coefficients on the quantity 
variables in these markets were insignificant, concluding that these two Lerner 
indices are zero before and after the introduction of RiceTec is reasonable as it is 
suggestive of a very flat inverse demand function to begin with.  
On the other hand, the Lerner indices in the UK and Kuwaiti markets, 
where both Indian and RiceTec exports are substantial, are interesting. Before the 
entry of RiceTec, the Lerner I index is 31% in the UK market and 35% in Kuwait. 
After the entry of RiceTec, these indices drop to 6% in the UK market10 and 15% 
in the Kuwaiti market. Lerner II indices for the UK and Kuwaiti markets tell the 
same story, dropping from 52% to 10% in the UK and 39% to 25% in Kuwait 
                                                 
10 A point to note: our results in the UK also correspond to the fact that prior to January 2006, 
there was no code of practice in the UK for Basmati rice specifying the characteristics that a 
particular rice must have in order to use the description “Basmati.” See Grain and Feed Trade 
Association, Code of Practice, available at, http://www.food.gov.uk. 
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after RiceTec arrives on the market. The decline in the Lerner indices after 
RiceTec’s entry is consistent with the story that India lost some of its distinct 
“brand” power for Basmati in these two key export markets.  
 
Table 2: Lerner Indices 
 
Country Before entry of RiceTec After Entry of RiceTec 
 Lerner I1 Lerner II 2 Lerner I 3 Lerner II 4 
United States 1.93% 2.28% 0.52% 0.86%  
Canada 5.99% 4.88%         6.88% 10.59% 
United Kingdom 31.54% 52.36%               6.53% 10.57% 
Kuwait 35.62% 39.88% 15.89% 25.04% 
1calculated using average quantities and prices prior to 1984 
2calculated using quantities and prices for each year prior to 1984 and averaged for the period 
3calculated using average quantities and prices after 1984 
4calculated using quantities and prices for each year after 1984 and averaged for the period  
 
6  Conclusion and Implications  
 
Different forms of intellectual property rights protection such as trademarks, 
geographical indications and patents have been around for a long time.11 But 
unlike industrialized countries that have a long history of protecting their 
intellectual property, the legal protection of intellectual property is still relatively 
new to developing countries. In developing markets, much emphasis has been 
placed on reducing tariffs and quotas with relatively little attention paid to 
strengthening intellectual property rights systems. With the advent of TRIPS all 
developing countries are required to strengthen their IPR system. Yet, many 
developing countries have failed to take much action in this regard or, as in the 
case of India with Basmati rice, have taken action very slowly.  
We examined the impact of incomplete protection of intellectual property 
by using the controversy regarding Basmati rice as an example. First, we argued 
why India’s Basmati rice exports were likely a good case study for economic 
harm from incomplete GI protection after the entry of a serious competitor, 
RiceTec. Next, we estimated the inverse residual demand curve for India’s 
Basmati rice exports to key importing nations. The relationship between the 
inverse residual demand curve and a price premium was used to determine the 
extent of damage caused to India after the entry of RiceTec. Our analysis 
                                                 
11 Protected designation of Origin (PDO), Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) and Traditional 
Specialty Guaranteed (TSG) are increasingly popular in the EU as a means for enhancing the 
creditability of a product and offering it protection. A recent study by Bouamra-Mechemache and 
Chaaban (2010) highlights the importance of PDO labels and examines the efficiency of PDO and 
the costs and benefits of PDO certification.  
 
16 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 9 [2011], Article 4
http://www.bepress.com/jafio/vol9/iss1/art4
indicates that of the four markets studied, the distinctiveness of Indian Basmati 
rice in the important export markets of the UK and Kuwait fell after the entry of 
RiceTec but there was no real change in markets for which the Basmati “brand” 
carried little premia (the US and Canada). This leads to the question of what 
might have happened had India been proactive in trademarking its Basmati 
variety or had TRIPS been more encompassing of traditional commodities as 
some nations wish.  
While further analysis is warranted, our findings are consistent with the 
impact of a substitute good in a differentiated products market.12 While further 
analysis is warranted, our findings suggest that India’s claim that Indian Basmati 
is losing its distinct image in certain export markets may have merit. The future of 
Indian Basmati rice exports may depend largely on how effectively RiceTec is 
able to market its rice as well as how successfully India preserves the distinct 
image of Basmati rice.  
As increasing numbers of countries seek protection of their traditional 
commodities (e.g., Jasmine rice in Thailand or Parmesan cheese in Italy), it is 
perhaps essential to revisit the TRIPS agreement. At the same time, for 
developing countries to be competitive in the international market, it is as 
important for them to strengthen their intellectual property system as it is to open 
their markets. Without proper national legislation governing intellectual property 
or extension of Article 23 to commodities other than wine and spirits, TRIPS as it 
is currently written may provide little help to developing countries trying to 
protect their traditional goods and practices.13 In the case of India, at the very 
least, it could have avoided the time and money spent in the legal battles over 
Basmati around the world had it improved its intellectual property system or had 
TRIPS been more encompassing.  
 
                                                 
12 Evidence from Europe indicates that products that are protected as GI command a distinct 
position in terms of higher price. In 2004, the turnover for GI protected products in France 
accounted for 15% of the global industry turnover while exports of GI protected products 
accounted for 30% of total food exports. See Stephane Passeri, Protection and Development of 
Geographical Indications in Asia, Conference on IP in Hong Kong and Mainland China, Best 
Practices and International Impact, 22 March 2007, 8. Similarly, evidence from China, indicates 
that the average price of Zhanhgui scallions has increased by 20-30% after being registered as a 
certification mark while the price for Pinggu peaches increased by 30% compared to regular 
peaches and by 50% for premium Pinggu peaches. See Xin and Ai Jie, Chinese Farmers Cash in 
on Intellectual Property Rights, September 2007, http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/17ct/17e/1013/ 
e101.htm. 
13 A recent study by Rangknekar (2010) looks at the limitations of TRIPS in protecting transborder 
GIs like Basmati and discusses alternatives for joint registration of Basmati by India and Pakistan 
to overcome TRIPS requirement of protection of GI in the home country.  
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